

# **Norms, attitudes and behaviors among young men in an urban slum: Observational outcomes and results from an experiment**

---

Atonu Rabbani

December 22, 2018

Department of Economics, University of Dhaka


BRAC School of Public Health

# Introduction

---

# Distribution of Gender Life Expectancy Gap


- Men on average lives about five years less.
- Wide variation in gender gaps in longevity suggests underlying socio-economic factors may have relevant roles.



Source: World Bank Data.

# Excess Disease Burden by Gender

- Burdens from different diseases are higher for men.
- Sometimes excessively so.



- Men overall enjoy higher access to resources, power and mobility.

# Motivations

- Men overall enjoy higher access to resources, power and mobility.
- Biology cannot explain the discrepancy entirely (recall wide cross-country variation).

# Motivations

- Men overall enjoy higher access to resources, power and mobility.
- Biology cannot explain the discrepancy entirely (recall wide cross-country variation).
- The literature suggests focusing on behavior to explain these gaps (Courtenay, 2000)

# Motivations

- Men overall enjoy higher access to resources, power and mobility.
- Biology cannot explain the discrepancy entirely (recall wide cross-country variation).
- The literature suggests focusing on behavior to explain these gaps (Courtenay, 2000)
- In particular negotiating the social power and status for men can shed some insights in this, which can either undermine or promote health behavior.



# Motivations

- Men overall enjoy higher access to resources, power and mobility.
- Biology cannot explain the discrepancy entirely (recall wide cross-country variation).
- The literature suggests focusing on behavior to explain these gaps (Courtenay, 2000)
- In particular negotiating the social power and status for men can shed some insights in this, which can either undermine or promote health behavior.
- Within men unobserved trait differences can also be helpful (even for aggression among women, see Reidy, Sloan and Zeichner, 2009)

# Motivations

- Men overall enjoy higher access to resources, power and mobility.
- Biology cannot explain the discrepancy entirely (recall wide cross-country variation).
- The literature suggests focusing on behavior to explain these gaps (Courtenay, 2000)
- In particular negotiating the social power and status for men can shed some insights in this, which can either undermine or promote health behavior.
- Within men unobserved trait differences can also be helpful (even for aggression among women, see Reidy, Sloan and Zeichner, 2009)
- We will use one such trait (masculine norm conformity) to understand risk taking behavior in the context of sex (Fleming, 2018).

## Focus of the Paper

- We pay attention to the social construction of certain masculine norm and conformity to the idealized (hegemonic?) concept of what is expected of men.

# Focus of the Paper

- We pay attention to the social construction of certain masculine norm and conformity to the idealized (hegemonic?) concept of what is expected of men.
- We explicitly model the roles of (a) the relative conformity factor and (b) social structure (agent's network) in a choice-theoretic framework.

# Focus of the Paper

- We pay attention to the social construction of certain masculine norm and conformity to the idealized (hegemonic?) concept of what is expected of men.
- We explicitly model the roles of (a) the relative conformity factor and (b) social structure (agent's network) in a choice-theoretic framework.
- We empirically test some of the implications of the model using a novel dataset.

# Model

---

# Model

A representative agent chooses  $s_i$  to optimize the following welfare function:

$$u(y_i - s_i) + \theta_i v(s_i) \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \mathbf{1}(m_i - \bar{m}_{-i}) \right) \quad (1)$$

Let me talk about each item separately.

# Model

A representative agent chooses  $s_i$  to optimize the following welfare function:

$$u(y_i - s_i) + \theta_i v(s_i) \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \mathbf{1}(m_i - \bar{m}_{-i}) \right) \quad (1)$$

Let me talk about each item separately.

- $s_i$  denotes riskier sex with a positive price (normalized).



# Model

A representative agent chooses  $s_i$  to optimize the following welfare function:

$$u(y_i - s_i) + \theta_i v(s_i) \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \mathbf{1}(m_i - \bar{m}_{-i}) \right) \quad (1)$$

Let me talk about each item separately.

- $s_i$  denotes riskier sex with a positive price (normalized).
- $\theta_i v'(s_i)$  suggests positive marginal utility from riskier sex:

# Model

A representative agent chooses  $s_i$  to optimize the following welfare function:

$$u(y_i - s_i) + \theta_i v(s_i) \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \mathbf{1}(m_i - \bar{m}_{-i}) \right) \quad (1)$$

Let me talk about each item separately.

- $s_i$  denotes riskier sex with a positive price (normalized).
- $\theta_i v'(s_i)$  suggests positive marginal utility from riskier sex:
- $m_i$  denotes the masculine norm (“being a man”) conformity (more on this below).

# Model

A representative agent chooses  $s_i$  to optimize the following welfare function:

$$u(y_i - s_i) + \theta_i v(s_i) \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \mathbf{1}(m_i - \bar{m}_{-i}) \right) \quad (1)$$

Let me talk about each item separately.

- $s_i$  denotes riskier sex with a positive price (normalized).
- $\theta_i v'(s_i)$  suggests positive marginal utility from riskier sex:
- $m_i$  denotes the masculine norm (“being a man”) conformity (more on this below).
- $\bar{m}_{-i}$  is an average of  $m_i$  over his peer.

A representative agent chooses  $s_i$  to optimize the following welfare function:

$$u(y_i - s_i) + \theta_i v(s_i) \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \mathbf{1}(m_i - \bar{m}_{-i}) \right) \quad (1)$$

Let me talk about each item separately.

- $s_i$  denotes riskier sex with a positive price (normalized).
- $\theta_i v'(s_i)$  suggests positive marginal utility from riskier sex:
- $m_i$  denotes the masculine norm (“being a man”) conformity (more on this below).
- $\bar{m}_{-i}$  is an average of  $m_i$  over his peer.
- $\alpha \in (1, \infty)$  defines how much “kick” he gets from having a higher masculine norm conformity compared to his peer: the *mucho*-ness, so to speak!

Optimal choice is governed by

$$u'(y_i - s_i^*) = \theta_i v'(s_i^*) \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \mathbf{1}(m_i - \bar{m}_{-i}) \right) \quad (2)$$


Optimal choice is governed by

$$u'(y_i - s_i^*) = \theta_i v'(s_i^*) \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \mathbf{1}(m_i - \bar{m}_{-i}) \right) \quad (2)$$

So the *sociology* of decision making requires

- the masculine norm conformity playing a role.
- positive marginal utility from riskier sex:  $\theta_i v'(s_i)$
- the relative position within one's social network matters if  $\alpha > 0$ , we test this in the data.

# Comparative Statics




# Data

---




# Social Network Data

- We have interviewed 824 young men between 18 and 29 years old.
- We have carefully mapped the entire social network (see the sociogram on the left).
- Only 557 respondents are included who has at least one tie.



# Risky Sexual Behavior

- We have very detailed self-reports on sexual behaviors.
  - Number of partners.
  - Intermittent use of condoms
  - Visiting female sex workers




# Gender Role Conflict Scale

- Based on the idea of *Gender Role Conflict* manifesting “a psychological state in which socialized gender roles have negative consequences for the person or others” (O’Neil, 2008)

# Gender Role Conflict Scale

- Based on the idea of *Gender Role Conflict* manifesting “a psychological state in which socialized gender roles have negative consequences for the person or others” (O’Neil, 2008)
- Suggests restrictive emotionality, obsession with achievement and success, socialized control, power, and competition issues



# Econometric Model

---

# Econometric Model

We can linearize the optimal decision in the following empirical model

$$Pr(D_i = 1) = a + bm_i + c\mathbf{1}(m_i - \bar{m}_{-i}) + X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

Here,

- $D_i = 1$  if the respondent reported being engaged risky sexual behavior in the last three months,  $D_i = 0$  otherwise
- $m_i$  is the GRC/S score for respondent  $i$
- $\mathbf{1}(m_i - \bar{m}_{-i})$  is a variable indicating if own  $m_i$  is higher than the group  $\bar{m}_{-i}$
- $X_i$  includes bunch of covariates such as marital status, education, age, occupations, being born in the community, wealth index.

# Findings

---

# Regression Results for Risky Sexual Behaviors

	= 1 if Risky Sexual Behavior Reported			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Own GRC/S Score (standardized)	1.233* (0.055)	1.288** (0.023)	1.357*** (0.008)	1.085 (0.543)
Friends Average Risky Sexual Behavior (standardized)		1.275** (0.013)	1.310*** (0.007)	1.286** (0.011)
Friends Average GRC/S Score (standardized)			0.794** (0.023)	
= 1 if Own GRC/S Score > Peer GRC/S Score				1.745** (0.022)



# Regression Results for Risky Sexual Behaviors

	= 1 if Risky Sexual Behavior Reported			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Own GRC/S Score (standardized)	1.233* (0.055)	1.288** (0.023)	1.357*** (0.008)	1.085 (0.543)
Friends Average Risky Sexual Behavior (standardized)		1.275** (0.013)	1.310*** (0.007)	1.286** (0.011)
Friends Average GRC/S Score (standardized)			0.794** (0.023)	
= 1 if Own GRC/S Score > Peer GRC/S Score				1.745** (0.022)

- Among other variables:
  - Education and wealth do not play any roles.
  - Being married is positively associated with risky sexual behavior.
  - More connected people also exhibit risky sexual behavior.

# Some Robustness Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Risk Behavior - Multiple Partners	Risk Behavior - Not Using Condom	= 1 if Risky Sexual Behavior Reported			
			Only Sexually Active	Married	Alternate Measures of Relative Masculinity Score	
Own GRC/S Score (standardized)	1.021	1.085	1.146	0.893	1.378*	1.333**
	(0.893)	(0.587)	(0.364)	(0.556)	(0.065)	(0.019)
Friends' Average GRC/S Score (standardized)	1.691*	1.618*	1.497	2.149**	1.272**	1.314***
	(0.060)	(0.083)	(0.140)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.009)
= 1 if Own GRC/S Score > Average Peer GRC/S Score	1.262**	1.200	1.234**	1.329**		
	(0.038)	(0.108)	(0.049)	(0.032)		
= 1 if Own GRC/S Score > Median GRC/S Score for the Community					0.846	
					(0.609)	
= 1 if Own GRC/S Score > Average GRC/S Score for Random Peer						1.026
						(0.457)
Observations	557	557	384	259	557	493

Note. We report the p-values in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## Some useful takeaways

---

## Some useful takeaways

- We extend the basic rational agent model by adding a socially constructed gender role concept, particularly gender specific role conformity.

## Some useful takeaways

- We extend the basic rational agent model by adding a socially constructed gender role concept, particularly gender specific role conformity.
- In addition to what has previously been seen in the literature (Fleming, 2018), we find one's relative position in the conformity hierarchy is a strong predictor.

## Some useful takeaways

- We extend the basic rational agent model by adding a socially constructed gender role concept, particularly gender specific role conformity.
- In addition to what has previously been seen in the literature (Fleming, 2018), we find one's relative position in the conformity hierarchy is a strong predictor.
- We cannot claim causality based on observational data, however, the relationship appears robust and not susceptible to falsification test.

# Psychodrama as an experiment

---

# Psychodramatic Interventions

- Recall: social norms around masculinity or gender roles are associated with risky sexual behaviors.
  - In a follow up paper, we have also looked at aggression and engagement in violence.




# Psychodramatic Interventions

- Recall: social norms around masculinity or gender roles are associated with risky sexual behaviors.
  - In a follow up paper, we have also looked at aggression and engagement in violence.
- Making these strict norms salient and empathizing (e.g. changing perspectives) can alter attitudes towards traditional gender norms.

# Psychodramatic Interventions

- Recall: social norms around masculinity or gender roles are associated with risky sexual behaviors.
  - In a follow up paper, we have also looked at aggression and engagement in violence.
- Making these strict norms salient and empathizing (e.g. changing perspectives) can alter attitudes towards traditional gender norms.
- We involved 40 young men from the same population in *psychodramatic* interventions which involve sociometry, social atom, role playing, games, group activities, and resolutions.

# Psychodramatic Interventions




# Psychodramatic Interventions



# Psychodramatic Interventions




# Psychodramatic Interventions: Sampling



## Outcome: Gender Equitable Men (GEM) Scale

- Has four domains:
  - **Violence domain:** There are times when a woman deserves to be beaten./A woman should tolerate violence to keep her family together./It is alright for a man to beat his wife if she is unfaithful, *among others*.
  - **Sexual relationships domain:** It is the man who decides what type of sex to have./It disgusts me when I see a man acting like a woman./A woman who has sex before she marries does not deserve respect, *among others*.
  - **Reproductive health and disease prevention domain:** Men should be outraged if their wives ask them to use a condom./It is a womans responsibility to avoid getting pregnant, *among others*.
  - **Domestic chores and daily life domain:** A womans role is taking care of her home and family./A man should have the final word about decisions in his home, *among others*.
- Coded as higher values mean higher traditional gender role conformity.

# Preliminary Results






# Preliminary Results

VARIABLES	(1) sdgem	(2) sdgema	(3) sdgemb	(4) sdgemc	(5) sdgemd
$t = 1$	-5.619*** (0.224)	-0.778*** (0.224)	-1.960*** (0.140)	-2.218*** (0.180)	-8.817*** (0.283)
$t = 2$	-6.789*** (0.225)	-3.295*** (0.225)	-1.579*** (0.181)	-2.209*** (0.224)	-10.04*** (0.288)
$d = 1$	0.237 (0.224)	1.740*** (0.224)	-0.0297 (0.146)	1.573*** (0.203)	-3.855*** (0.307)
$t = 1 \times d = 1$	-1.144*** (0.316)	-3.526*** (0.316)	0.0601 (0.201)	-1.989*** (0.267)	3.090*** (0.341)
$t = 2 \times d = 1$	-0.365 (0.319)	-2.494*** (0.319)	-0.162 (0.261)	-1.203*** (0.347)	3.882*** (0.355)
Observations	237	237	237	237	237
R-squared	0.910	0.804	0.573	0.707	0.939

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Preliminary Results: ICC



# Conclusions

---

# Acknowledgements

- BRAC James P Grant School of Public Health for overall research support
- Specially our *Psychodrama* team
- The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO)-WOTRO Science for Global Development for funding

---

**Thank you**

Email: [atonu.rabbani@du.ac.bd](mailto:atonu.rabbani@du.ac.bd)